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bstract
African countries have had the notoriety of being characterized by unsustainable external debt. Despite several announced intents by world
evelopment agencies to reverse this trend, there appears to be only minimal progress. This paper points to failure to determine appropriate levels
f sustainable external debt, inadequate effective governance infrastructure, and ineffective management of external shocks, as important reasons
hy Africa’s external debt problems have persisted. We derive African-relevant thresholds for sustainable external debt, and highlight quantifiable
mprovements African countries can experience if they were to adopt better governance infrastructures and effective management of external
hocks.2011 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
Since the inception of multinational debt crisis in the
arly 1980s, African countries’ external debt has remained
nsustainable,1 with these countries sadly bearing the attendant
elfare reducing effects of unsustainable indebtedness (Cohen,
993; Fosu, 1999; Iyoha, 1999; Gumisai, 2001; Boyce and
dikumana, 2001; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003; Ndikumana,
004; Loser, 2004). Whilst grappling with this albatross, most of
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +27 11 717 3764; fax: +27 11 717 3849.
E-mail address: Kalu.ojah@wits.ac.za (K. Ojah).
1 External debt sustainability refers to the ability of a country to meet the
urrent and future external debt obligations of both private and public sectors
ithout: running into arrears, recourse to debt-rescheduling, and a need for
alance-of-payments adjustment (Akyüz, 2007; UNCTAD/UNDP, 1996).
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.hese countries have severally rescheduled their external debts
hich, in turn, worsened their external debt problems. In fact,
ub-Saharan African countries started rescheduling their debts
s from 1989. In 1989, the total amount of debt rescheduled
as US$13.94 billion, by 2000 it had risen to US$22.63 billion.
t declined to US$1.03 billion in 2007. On average, between
989 and 2007, the region’s total external debt rescheduled was
S$5.14 billion.
However, researchers (e.g., Claessens, 1990; Semmler and
ieveking, 2000; Easterly, 2002; Cassimon and Vaessen, 2007;
errarini, 2008) provide evidence that external borrowing can
id economic growth and development when used productively
nd at sustainable levels. Examples of countries that have used
ebt in sustainable versus unsustainable ways can be found in
outh Korea versus Indonesia in East Asia, Chile and Brazil
ersus Argentina in South America, and Ghana versus Zambia in
frica. Further, recent evidence suggests that countries formerly
haracterized by unsustainable debt can dispense of the albatross
nd move their economy forward, as Indonesia appears to be
oing.
Very few African countries known to have been charac-
erized by unsustainable external debt has been decidedly
nshackled from its burden. This view is substantiated by Yang
nd Nyberg (2009) who show that long term debt sustainability
emains a challenge for post completion point, highly indebted
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trade-offs arising from past borrowing decisions. Examples of
liquidity monitoring indicators include the debt service to GDP
ratio, external debt service to exports ratio and government debtS. Muhanji, K. Ojah / Review of D
oor countries (HIPCs).2 This persistence of unsustainable
ndebtedness despite the attainment of this “milestone” is
ttributable to structural vulnerabilities of these economies,
uch as a narrow export base, weak institutions and governance,
oor domestic resource mobilization, and inadequate debt
anagement capacity. The pertinent question, which is the
rimary concern in this study, is why unsustainable external
ebt and its consequences have remained seemingly intractable
mong African seemingly ever emerging economies?
We argue that three main factors are responsible for this
ersistent undesirable situation. First, it is fundamental to get
ight what constitutes sustainable debt for a country before any
ttempt to reverse its debt level to such a threshold can bear
he desired result. It does appear that the appropriate thresh-
lds for African countries have not been ascertained (Gumisai,
001; Easterly, 2005; Caliari, 2006; IMF and World Bank, 2006;
anasse and Roubini, 2009). Second, African countries appear
ot to have taken fully into cognizance the linkages between suc-
essful management of external debt and effective management
f external shocks, such as world commodity price and inter-
st rates vacillation. Senhadji (1997, 2003) shows that linkages
etween these two macro-management imperatives, are largely
esponsible for the accumulation of unsustainable indebtedness
n small open economies, such as those in Africa. Third, political
ill and effective governance infrastructures are vital for both
scertaining sustainable debt thresholds and implementing poli-
ies that would move and keep countries at such desirable levels.
frican countries appear not to be exemplary in this respect
Mwega and Rwegasira, 2003; Ndikumana and Boyce, 1998;
aufmann et al., 2008).
This paper, therefore, sets out to derive sustainable exter-
al debt thresholds that would be more appropriate for African
conomies. It identifies from extant empirical and theoretical
uides, external shocks that are characteristically linked to exter-
al debt accumulation and its attendant difficulties. Importantly,
he paper provides concrete measures of debt management
ains that are possible were African countries to adopt, from
ther regions of emerging economies, best practices in debt
elevant macroeconomic management and governance infras-
ructure provisioning.
The empirical results of this paper provide encouraging signs
n some effective ways of eventually aiding African countries
o achieve manageable external debt levels. Derived sustain-
ble external debt thresholds are substantially below levels that
ave hitherto been recommended by world development agen-
ies, such as IMF and the World Bank (particularly via the
ighly indebted poor countries initiative – HIPC): that is, debt
o GDP ratio of 80%, debt to exports ratio of 60% and short-
erm debt to reserves ratio of 80% are less than corresponding
atios of 250%, 150% and 130%, respectively, recommended
y the World Bank for HIPCs. Levels of external debt above
2 Note that as of end of September 2008, 23 countries had reached the HIPC
ompletion point, and many of these countries are in Africa (most of which are
lso in this study’s sample). Post completion point countries are those that have
ulfilled all the reforms that are required for full external debt cancellation.
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hese thresholds identified and suggested by this current study
end to yield negative economic growth for African countries.
mproving African countries’ governance infrastructures (politi-
al and legal) and macro-management practices to the standards
f East Asian emerging economies would see African coun-
ries reduce their external debt levels considerably. Similar gains
ould accrue were African countries to adopt governance best
ractices of South American emerging economies, but not their
acroeconomic management style.
Next, Section 2 presents both theoretical and empirical back-
rounds around the issue of sustainable external indebtedness;
his is followed by the method adopted to empirically esti-
ate, what in this study, is considered more African-relevant
xternal debt thresholds. Section 3 extends results from the
hresholds determination exercise to the effects of policy and
overnance infrastructures on external debt management. Here
ome concrete (measurable) gains from adopting better macro-
anagement practices and effective governance infrastructures
re computed. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper by recap-
ing both the essence and findings of the study.
. Thresholds for sustainable debt
The theoretical literature suggests that foreign borrowing has
positive impact on the investment and growth up to a certain
hreshold; beyond this threshold, however, its impact is adverse,
iving rise to a “Laffer curve” type relationship between exter-
al debt, on the one hand, and investment and per capita income
rowth on the other (Claessens, 1990; Semmler and Sieveking,
000). According to the IMF (2000), there are various indicators
or determining a sustainable level of external debt. These indi-
ators are primarily in the form of ratios and they aid policy mak-
rs in their external debt management duties. These indicators
an be thought of as measures of the country’s “solvency3” in
hat they consider the stock of debt at a certain time in relation to
he country’s ability to generate resources to repay the outstand-
ng balance. Examples of such indicators of debt management
apacity include the debt to GDP ratio, foreign debt to exports
atio, government debt to current fiscal revenue ratio, share of
oreign debt to total debt and short-term debt to total debt.
The IMF (2000) also notes that a second set of indicators
ocuses on the short-term liquidity requirements of the country
ith respect to its debt service obligations.4 These indicators
re not only useful early-warning signs of debt service prob-
ems, but they also highlight the impact of the inter-temporal3 IMF (2000) defines solvency as the country’s ability to discharge its external
bligations on a continuing basis. If debt can be rolled over at maturity, countries
re solvent and if the present value of net interest payments does not exceed the
resent value of current account inflows.
4 IMF (2000) posits that lliquidity problems arise when a shortage of liquid
ssets affects the ability of an economy to discharge its immediate external
bligations. Liquidity problems always emerge in circumstances that give rise
o insolvency or unwillingness to pay.
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Congo and Liberia are above their GDPs even after the two coun-
tries reached their HIPC completion points. Note how almost all
HIPCs exhibit trends where indebtedness surpasses GDP.586 S. Muhanji, K. Ojah / Review of D
ervice to current fiscal revenue ratio. The next set of indica-
ors are more forward looking as they point out how the debt
urden will evolve over time, given the current stock of debt
nd average interest rate. These dynamic ratios show how the
ebt burden ratios would change in the absence of repayments or
ew disbursements, indicating the stability of the debt burden.
n example of a dynamic debt management ratio is the ratio of
he average interest rate on outstanding debt to the growth rate
f nominal GDP.
External debt sustainability can also be measured by the
urrent account balance (IMF, 2000). If deficits persist, the coun-
ry’s external position may eventually become unsustainable as
eflected by a rising ratio of external debt to GDP. In other
ords, financing of continually large current account deficits
y the issuance of debts leads to an increasing debt burden. This
ndermines solvency and leads to external vulnerability from a
iquidity perspective, owing to the need to repay large amounts
f debt periodically (e.g., monthly, quarterly or bi-annually).
Different thresholds for external debt sustainability have so
ar been computed. The threshold for debt sustainability under
he HIPC initiative is, for example, pegged at a debt to export
atio of 150% and a debt to GNI ratio of 250%. In their empirical
tudy, Pattillo et al. (2002) compute debt thresholds by assum-
ng that the HIPC initiative will halve countries’ debt levels.
hey use year 2000’s debt ratios as their benchmark values, and
nd that debt negatively affects per capita growth when debt-to-
xports ratio is 160–170% and debt-to-GDP ratio is 35–40%.
More recently, Manasse and Roubini (2009) suggest that a
uller set of predictor variables for external debt management
nclude, among others, the total external debt to GDP ratio,
hort-term debt to reserves ratio, real GDP growth, public exter-
al debt to fiscal revenue ratio, external financial requirements
current account balance plus short-term debt to foreign reserves
atio), exchange rate overvaluation, and exchange rate volatil-
ty. According to them, a relatively “debt safe” country type is
escribed by a handful of debt management prerequisites: low
otal external debt (below 49.7% of GDP); low short-term debt
below 130% of reserves); low public external debt (below 214%
f fiscal revenue); and an exchange rate that is not excessively
ppreciated (overvaluation below 48%).
Manasse and Roubini identify three types of debt-related
isks, which include solvency (or debt un-sustainability), illiq-
idity, and macro-exchange rate risks. The risk of unsustainable
xternal debt is characterized by external debt in excess of 49.7%
f GDP, together with monetary or fiscal imbalances, and large
xternal financing needs that signal illiquidity. The liquidity risk
s identified by moderate debt levels, in conjunction with short-
erm debt in excess of 130% of reserves, political uncertainty,
nd tight international capital markets. Macro-exchange rate risk
ypes arise from the combination of low growth and relatively
xed exchange rates. Each of these risk types differs in their
ikelihood to produce a debt crisis.
In contrast to these preceding views on indicators of indebt-dness, Caliari (2006) argues that these various indicators used
o establish the debt thresholds are poor proxies for how an
conomy is faring and, particularly, how well a government
s meeting its revenue needs to achieve human development
R
L
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oals. He contends that the HIPC initiative has been heavily
riticized for relying mainly on debt-to-export and debt-service-
o-export ratios as indicators for measuring sustainability of
ndebtedness. For instance, he finds that export revenue does
ot necessarily correlate with growth, poverty reduction rates or,
ore importantly, fiscal revenue. Furthermore, he notes that the
hosen thresholds, being fixed numerical thresholds, are unable
o capture the possible variation in a country’s situations. Caliari
ecommends that human development imperatives take prece-
ence over debt payments, with debt sustainability assessments
eared towards ensuring that debtor countries are able to ful-
l the financing requirements needed to meet both the human
evelopment and the millennium development goals.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the most commonly used
ndicators of indebtedness are the debt service ratio, debt to GDP
atio, international reserves to debt ratio, international reserves to
ebt service ratio, and interest payments to net export earnings.
n view of the fact that most African countries are still bat-
ling with debt service problems even though they have achieved
ebt sustainability thresholds envisaged by the HIPC initiative,
here is a need to identify thresholds that will lead to better debt
anagement for them. Further, HIPC thresholds of indebted-
ess are too high given that these countries are as well grappling
ith both weak macroeconomic and governance infrastructures.
rom the information in Table A1 (in the Appendix), notice that
ven though under the HIPC initiative a debt to GNP level of
ess than 250% is deemed sustainable, the poorer African coun-
ries like Zambia and Tanzania had achieved that threshold by
995 when these countries were still grappling with heavy debt
ervice problems and were asked to reschedule their debts. In
act, most sample countries had debt to GNP ratios of below
00%. Furthermore, note that the Sub-Saharan African coun-
ries and Latin American countries also have persistent current
ccount deficits that threaten their external debt sustainability
see Fig. A1).
Tellingly, by 2005, Malawi, which was both at the decision
oint and had received 90% debt relief, had not achieved HIPC’s
ebt to export ratio of 150%. Additionally, by 2008, Burkina
aso, The Gambia and Liberia had not achieved HIPC’s debt
o export ratio of 150%. In fact, Easterly (2002) posits that
ebt relief does not even bring about a reduction in debt, as
overnments of poor countries borrow anew until they again
ecome heavily indebted. A related argument is put forth by
errarini (2008) who argues that full debt cancellation falls short
f providing a long-term solution in the event of a renewed
uild-up of unsustainable debt levels, as the HIPC initiative has
mply demonstrated. This observation is highlighted by Fig. 1,
n which external debts of both the Democratic Republic of5 HIPCs included in the sample are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire,
epublic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, Ghana,
iberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda
nd Zambia.
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Going by Manasse and Roubini’s (2009) thresholds,
frican countries are battling with both liquidity and sol-
ency problems. It is therefore paramount that workable
hresholds that can be used as benchmarks for effective
ebt borrowing and management are identified. Among other
enefits, this paper contributes to the literature by com-
uting workable debt sustainability thresholds for African
ountries.
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.1. Empirical model for external debt thresholds
To identify appropriate thresholds for external debt, regres-
ion models are estimated, wherein the indebtedness ratios
re regressed against different thresholds. Three regions of the
orld’s emerging economies are then compared: Latin America,
ast Asia and Africa. Africa is represented by twenty four coun-
ries that include Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic
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epublic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
he Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali,
ozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
anzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The sample
onsists of both HIPCs and non-HIPCs. Latin America is repre-
ented by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica,
exico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela; whilst East Asia is rep-
esented by South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
hailand. The East Asian and Latin American countries are
argely middle income countries that have managed to sustain
heir external debts.
i
A
Ainued).
In selecting Latin America and East Asia as benchmarks,
everal factors were considered. First, East Asian countries
sed their external borrowing to pursue export-promoting poli-
ies that are not laissez-faire (Sachs and Williamson, 1985).
atin American countries, like African countries, did not use
heir foreign borrowing to develop a resource base in tradable
oods, especially export industries that are adequate for future
ebt servicing. Exports grew more rapidly in East Asia than
n Latin America and Africa; in fact, export growth in East
sia greatly outstripped GDP growth. Second, Africa and Latin
merica overvalued their currencies and encouraged capital
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ight hence leading to “flight-driven external borrowing,” in
hich the export of capital generates an economy-wide demand
or replacement funds, and “flight-fuelled external borrowing,”
n which residents who exported capital then “borrow” their
wn money back6”. Sachs and Williamson (1985) observe that
oreign borrowing by Latin American countries largely went
owards the private sector’s accumulation of foreign assets,
ather than towards increase of export capacity. East Asia on
ts part devalued its currency to promote its export sector.
hird, both Africa and Latin America’s terms of trade deteri-
rated faster than East Asia’s terms of trade. See Fig. A1 in
he Appendix for further comparisons of debt profile between
egions of emerging economies.
Data for indicators of indebtedness for the three regions cover
970–2008. In computing the thresholds, we follow Clements
t al. (2003) by running regressions of debt indicators against
arious thresholds. Thresholds used for this benchmarking,
ange from indebtedness ratio of 0 to >200%. Each threshold
evel is coded 1 whilst others are coded 0, repeatedly. Data
ources are World Bank’s Global Development Fund and World
evelopment Indicators. The thresholds serve as independent
ariables. Both debt to GDP ratio and the debt to exports ratio
apture solvency whilst short-term debt to international reserves
atio captures liquidity. These indebtedness indicators serve var-
ously as dependent variables. We estimate the model using the
xed effects method.7 The advantage of a fixed effects model is
hat it provides consistent estimates in the presence of country-
pecific effects that are correlated with the explanatory variables
n the model (Table 1).
The results for the regression of different indicators of
ndebtedness against different thresholds for the three regions
Africa, Latin America and East Asia – show that the debt to
DP ratio falls if either a country’s GDP rises faster than debt or
f external debt falls whilst GDP remains unchanged. External
ebt to GDP levels of 60–80% are sustainable for Africa
hilst in Latin America, a debt-to-GDP ratio of 120–150% is
ustainable. These results imply that when African countries
ontract debt, they should ensure that the debt does not exceed
0% of GDP. The debt sustainability level for Latin America
120–150%), for instance, would portend insolvency for African
ountries. Using debt to exports ratio, the sustainable debt
evel for Africa is 40–60% of export earnings whereas in Latin
merica, a debt level that is 20–40% of export earnings is sus-
ainable. Given that exports are used to repay the debt, African
ountries should not exceed a debt to exports ratio of 60%. For
ast Asia, the debt to exports threshold is 60–80%. The higher
ebt-to-exports ratio of East Asian countries relative to those of
frican and Latin American countries is a confirmation of theuperior exports performance of the East Asian region. Overall,
hese regional debt thresholds are far much below HIPC
6 See Boyce (1992) for a detailed discussion of “flight-driven external bor-
owing” and “flight-fuelled external borrowing”.
7 The panel used in this regression is unbalanced, hence the fixed effects
ethod gives valid and consistent estimates.
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nitiative’s recommended debt to exports ratio of 150% and
attillo et al.’s (2002) threshold of 160–170% debt to exports.
On liquidity, short-term debt to reserve ratio should not
xceed 80% for all the three regions. This ratio is below that
uggested by Manasse and Roubini (2009) – 130% of short-term
ebt to reserves. For Africa and Asia, a liquidity threshold of
30% has an insignificant negative effect on debt accumulation
hilst for Latin America the same threshold has an insignificant
ositive effect on debt accumulation.
.2. Impact of external debt thresholds on the output of
ountries
To determine the impact of the thresholds computed above on
he sample countries’ wealth, Eq. (1), which reflects equilibrium
n the goods market, is estimated.8
t = θ1Ct + θ2Gt + θ3Xt − θ4Cmt − θ5Imt , (1)
here Yt is output; Ct is consumption; Gt is government expen-
iture; Xt is exports; Cmt represents consumption imports; and
m
t is imported investments. We measure output, consumption,
overnment expenditure, exports and consumption imports by
aking the logarithm of Gross Domestic Product, household
onsumption, government expenditure, exports and imports,
espectively. We use gross fixed capital formation as a proxy
o measure imported investments. The assumption here is that
hese countries import capital for investment purposes.
The ratio of price index of exports to price index of imports
aptures the terms of trade. Terms of trade measures the effect of
olatility in commodity prices. Relative interest rate is computed
y the ratio of the world interest rate to the domestic interest rate.
he USA lending rate is used as the proxy for world interest rate.
he ratio measures the direction of portfolio capital flow into and
rom the domestic economy; it is expected to relate negatively to
utput. The intuition here is that an increase in the relative inter-
st rate implies that capital flows out of the domestic economy;
hus, GDP falls. In fact, empirical literature provides evidence
hat capital outflow depresses GDP (Boyce, 1992; Ajayi, 1997;
oyce and Ndikumana, 2001; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003).
hese two variables, terms of trade and relative interest rate,
ill be used as proxies to measure external shocks.
The relative interest rate, terms of trade, lagged inflation
which measures macroeconomic instability) and exchange rate
re included as explanatory variables, in addition to household
onsumption, exports, consumption imports and investment
mports. The ratio of debt-to-GDP and debt-to-exports also
nters the baseline model interchangeably as explanatory vari-
bles. The dependent variable in this model is the growth rate of
DP.
A panel data of the 24 African countries is used for estimatinghis model. The panel is unbalanced and hence we use the fixed
ffects method to estimate the coefficients of the regression. In
act, Judson and Owen (1999) argue that the fixed effects model
8 This model is adopted from Muhanji and Ojah (2011), who derive a structural
odel of external debt evolution for small open economies of Africa.
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Table 1
Threshold levels for external debt indicators.
Thresholds
(Percent) Africa Latin America East Asia
Log
(ETD/GDP)
Log
(EDT/XGS)
Log
(SETD/RES)
Log
(ETD/GDP)
Log
(EDT/XGS)
Log
(SETD/RES)
Log
(ETD/GDP)
Log
(EDT/XGS)
Log
(SETD/RES)
Intercept 0.196
(4.83)***
0.206
(0.51)
0.376
(1.86)*
0.203
(5.20)***
−0.239
(−5.55)***
0.050
(1.07)
0.308
(2.05)**
−0.421
(−2.34)**
−0.425
(−2.22)**
<20 −0.313
(−4.58)***
−2.118
(−4.88)***
−3.495
(−15.03)***
−0.991
(−24.24)***
(dropped)a −1.253
(−18.72)***
−0.463
(−2.98)***
(dropped) a −0.682
(−3.22)***
>20–40 −0.195
(−3.83***
−1.218
(−2.93)***
−1.533
(−6.38)***
−0.725
(−18.15)***
−0.335
(−4.35)***
−0.609
(−10.65)***
−0.388
(−2.56)**
−0.291
(−1.54)
−0.431
(−2.17)**
>40–60 −0.136
(−2.68)**
−0.884
(−2.14)**
−0.999
(−4.09)***
−0.521
(−13.17)***
(dropped) a −0.364
(−6.61)***
−0.196
(−1.30)
−0.255
(−1.37)
−0.442
(−2.31)**
>60–80 −0.090
(−1.80)*
−0.549
(−1.33)
−0.566
(−2.13)**
−0.376
(−9.55)***
0.112
(2.21)**
−0.193
(−3.41)***
−0.100
(−0.66)
−0.319
(−1.73)*
−0.378
(−1.89)*
>80–100 −0.046
(−0.96)
−0.289
(−0.70)
−0.389
(−1.48)
−0.269
(−6.48)***
0.236
(4.47)***
−0.083
(−1.47)
−0.039
(−0.25)
−0.116
(−0.63)
−0.294
(−1.43)
>100–120 −0.036
(−0.73)
−0.216
(−0.53)
0.271
(0.77)
−0.170
(−4.04)***
0.289
(5.53)***
(dropped) a (dropped) a 0.045
(0.25)
−0.275
(−1.34)
>120–150 0.237
(4.48)***
0.148
(0.36)
0.315
(0.90)
−.092
(−2.03)**
0.398
(8.84)***
0.075
(1.33)
0.299
(1.40)
0.184
(1.00)
−0.280
(−1.39)
>150–200 0.638
(9.85)***
0.453
(1.11)
0.372
(1.20)
(dropped) a 0.510
(11.45)***
0.239
(3.73)***
0.207
(1.13)
0.200
(1.09)
−0.317
(−1.57)
>200 0.196
(4.83)***
1.183
(2.90)***
1.890
(1.86)*
(dropped) a 0.713
(16.30)***
0.425
(7.56)***
0.925
(5.62)***
0.437
(2.39)**
0.059
(0.31)
Observations 882 885 819 378 377 374 190 189 186
Overall R2 0.8434 0.8250 0.7317 0.9226 0.7902 0.7750 0.6246 0.4924 0.4535
F (H0: all coefficients = 0) 13.52*** 17.91*** 7.15*** 4.08*** 16.02*** 3.93*** 53.28*** 14.01*** 1.40
The table contains fixed effects estimates of different threshold levels. The column headings are logarithms of external debt to GDP ratio (ETD/GDP), external debt to exports ratio (ETD/XGS) and, short term
external debt to international reserves (SETD/RES). The t-stats are in parentheses.
a These thresholds did not have data and were therefore dropped from the regression.
* Significance levels of 10%.
** Significance levels of 5%.
*** Significance levels of 1%.
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Table 2
Effect of threshold-based external debt on GDP for African countries (dependent variable: growth rate of GDP).
Variables ETD/GDP < 80% ETD/GDP > 80% Variables ETD/XGS < 60% ETD/XGS > 60% ETD/XGS > 150%
Intercept 5.626
(11.85)***
9.275
(52.09)***
Intercept 4.016
(6.97)***
9.153
(45.03)***
8.437
(39.72)***
Consumption 0.024
(0.45)
0.148
(3.84)***
Consumption −0.082
(−1.47)
0.178
(4.69)***
0.264
(7.05)***
Exports 0.561
(4.64)***
0.192
(3.59)***
Exports 0.494
(3.88)***
0.208
(3.26)***
0.179
(2.62)**
Consumption imports −0.404
(−2.66)***
−0.320
(−4.39)***
Consumption imports −0.011
(−0.07)
−0.495
(−5.92)***
−0.590
(−7.19)***
Imported investments 0.281
(3.46)***
0.052
(1.42)
Imported investments 0.211
(2.47)**
0.188
(4.33)***
0.304
(6.51)***
Terms of trade −0.024
(0.75)
−0.045
(−6.25)***
Terms of trade 0.016
(0.46)
−0.046
(−4.96)***
−0.055
(−5.26)***
Relative interest rate −0.034
(−0.79)
−0.186
(−7.78)***
Relative interest rate −0.012
(−0.26)
−0.201
(−7.32)***
−0.217
(−8.50)***
Exchange rate 0.217
(10.84)***
0.033
(4.14)***
Exchange rate 0.304
(13.52)***
0.034
(3.72)***
0.149
(6.86)***
Lagged inflation 0.001
(4.99)***
0.0001
(0.49)
Lagged inflation 0.002
(5.00)***
−0.0001
(−0.44)
0.0007
(1.39)
Debt to GDP ratio 0.042
(0.75)
−0.191
(−15.09)***
Debt to exports ratio 0.091
(8.61)***
−0.020
(−7.44)***
−0.012
(−4.37)***
Observations 359 281 256 384 291
F(H0: ui = 0) 83.84*** 209.07*** 109.99*** 152.53*** 133.71***
The Z-stats are in parentheses. The variable ETD/GDP < 80% represents the debt-to-GDP ratio that is below 80% whilst ETD/GDP > 80% represents the debt-GDP
ratio that is above 80%. Similarly, ETD/XGS < 60% represents the debt-to-exports ratio that is below 60% whilst ETD/XGS > 60% represents the debt-to-exports
ratio that is above 60%. The variable ETD/XGS > 150% is the World Bank threshold for HIPC countries.
* Significance levels of 10%.
*
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s a common choice for macroeconomists, and it is generally
ore appropriate than a random effects model for two reasons.
irst, if the individual effect represents omitted variables, it is
ikely that these country-specific characteristics are correlated
ith the other regressors. Second, it is also likely that a typical
acro panel will contain most countries of interest and, thus,
ill not likely be a random sample from a much larger universe
f countries. For these reasons, only the fixed effects model
esults are reported. Wooldridge (2002) supports Judson and
wen (1999) and insists that the test statistics based on the unbal-
nced fixed effects analysis are consistent and asymptotically
ormal.
The data for estimating the model is divided into two
hreshold-based halves: the portion before the threshold (of 80%
ebt to GDP or 60% debt to exports) and the portion after the
hreshold. We use external debt to GDP and external debt to
xports to identify how different thresholds affect the growth
ate of GDP. We also test the World Bank recommended ratio of
ebt to exports ratio of 150% alongside our thresholds. Results
f this estimation are presented in Table 2.
In estimating the model, we dropped government expendi-
9ure because of its high correlation with imported investments.
esults confirm that high levels of external debt negatively
nd significantly affect GDP whilst low levels of external debt
9 Note that these countries import capital for investment purposes and there-
ore imported investments form part of their government expenditure.
e
i
l
d
o
rncrease GDP (see last row of Table 2). Specifically, when debt-
o-GDP ratio increases by 1% above a debt-to-GDP ratio of 80%,
rowth rate in GDP significantly falls by 0.19%. This result sug-
ests that a high level of external debt retards the economy. At
ow debt levels (i.e., <80% debt to GDP), an increase in the debt-
o-GDP ratio insignificantly increases GDP by 0.04%. At this
ow debt level, exports, imported investments, lagged inflation
nd a depreciation of the exchange rate increases growth rate of
DP whilst consumption imports reduce GDP.
At high debt levels, household consumption, exports, and a
epreciation of the exchange rate increases GDP whilst con-
umption imports, relative interest rate and the terms of trade
epress GDP. Relative interest rate negatively affects GDP
ecause foreign interest rate is higher than the domestic interest
ate and consequently capital flows out of the country. Capital
utflow has a detrimental effect on GDP. Terms of trade have an
nteresting effect, in the sense that they negatively affect GDP
t high levels of debt. This can be explained by the fact that
hese countries mainly export primary commodities; so when
he terms of trade improve, they suffer from the “Dutch disease”
nd hence GDP falls.
When external debt-to-exports ratio is substituted into the
quation in place of external debt-to-GDP ratio, an increase
n the debt-to-exports ratio increases growth rate of GDP at
ow levels (<60% debt to exports). Specifically, an increase in
ebt-to-exports ratio by 1% significantly increases growth rate
f GDP by 0.09%. On the other hand, at high debt-to-exports
atio (>60% debt to exports), an increase in debt-to-exports ratio
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ignificantly reduces growth rate of GDP by 0.02%. Note that
he effects of pertinent macroeconomic factors (which largely
erve as controls in this analysis) are robust to the choice of
ndebtedness indicators used in our validation of the derived
frican-relevant thresholds for sustainable indebtedness.
The literature has identified poor governance as a main
mpediment to the sustainability of external debt in African
ountries. These countries cannot sustain the above recom-
ended ratios if issues of adequate governance infrastructures
re not addressed. In fact, Manasse et al. (2003) argue that insti-
utional factors affect policy credibility as well as a government’s
bility to pursue policies consistent with a sustainable debt path.
herefore, the next section analyzes the impact of institutional
nfrastructure (both legal and political) on debt sustainability.
. Governance infrastructures and external debt
ustainability
Crucial institutions and governance structures play important
oles in debt sustainability. Chauvin and Kraay (2005) show
hat debt relief, in 62 developing countries during 1989–2003,
either improved the institutional quality nor raised the levels
f foreign direct investment (FDI) or economic growth. Easterly
2002) finds that highly indebted poor countries became highly
ndebted mainly because of poor policies, not because of external
hocks or wars. He concludes that lenders did not adhere to
rudential rules and that the IMF and the World Bank provided
ar more financing to HIPCs throughout 1979–1997 than to other
merging economies of similar income levels, although relevant
olicies in many HIPCs had been worse.
This study follows Kaufmann et al. (2008) in defining gover-
ance infrastructures as the traditions and institutions by which
uthority is exercised in a country. This includes the process by
hich governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the
apacity of the government to effectively formulate and imple-
ent sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state
or institutions that govern economic and social interactions
mong them. The six dimensions of governance include voice
nd accountability, political stability and absence of violence,
overnment effectiveness, and rule of law, regulatory quality
nd control of corruption.
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent
o which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting
heir government as well as freedom of expression, freedom of
ssociation and a free media. Political stability and absence of
iolence captures perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ent will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
iolent means. Government effectiveness captures the percep-
ions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
ervice and the degree of its independence from political pres-
ures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and
he credibility of the government’s commitment to such poli-
ies. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of
he government to formulate and implement sound policies and
egulations that permit and promote private sector development.
ule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents
ave confidence in and abide by the rules of the society, and in
3
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articular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
he police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
iolence. Finally, control of corruption captures the perceptions
f the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.
Instead of using the six governance indices separately in the
nalysis, they are grouped into two broad constructs: political
nd legal. The political variable is computed as the average of
oice and accountability, government effectiveness and, political
tability and absence of violence whilst the legal variable is
omputed as the average of the rule of law and regulatory quality.
he aim of this section is to identify the role that governance
nfrastructure plays in external debt management.
Data on governance is downloaded from the World Bank’s
orld Governance Indicators. The scores lie between 2.5 and
2.5, with higher scores indicating better outcomes. (For details
n computation of the indices see Kaufmann et al., 2008). Data
or governance indices covers 1996–2009.
.1. Empirical analysis
To gauge the effect of governance infrastructures on debt
ustainability, we run regressions of debt indicators against insti-
utional variables and macroeconomic variables. External debt
o GDP (the solvency indicator) and short-term debt to inter-
ational reserves (the liquidity indicator) ratios are used as the
ependent variables. As part of the explanatory variables, insti-
utional variables such as political and legal infrastructures, and
acroeconomic variables such as inflation rate volatility, terms
f trade, and the relative interest rate which capture both a coun-
ry’s ability to pay and willingness to pay are included in the
odel.
The vector Xi,t represents ratios of exports earnings to GDP,
onsumption imports to GDP, imported investments to GDP;
xchange rate, terms of trade, relative interest rate and gov-
rnance (institutional) variables such as political and legal
nfrastructures. The variable Zi,t−1 represents the lagged infla-
ion rate and the lagged growth rate of GDP. The lagged inflation
ate enters as a policy variable and is used to capture macroe-
onomic instability. The dependent variables (debt to GDP and
hort-term debt to reserves ratios, respectively) are represented
y Yi,t. The model is thus of the form:
i,t = β0 +
N∑
i=1
βiXi,t +
2∑
j=1
αjZj,t−1 + εi,t t = 1, . . . , T. (2)
q. (2) is estimated for the three regions of East Asia, Latin
merica and Africa. Three panel regressions are estimated for:
ll the 39 countries, East Asian countries, Latin American coun-
ries and African countries, respectively. Most of the variables
ave the expected signs. Eq. (2) is also estimated for HIPC and
on-HIPC African countries and most of the variables retain
heir expected signs..2. Results and discussion of region-based tests
Table 3 reports results of the regressions for debt sustain-
bility indicators of solvency and liquidity, respectively, against
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Table 3
Fixed effects estimation of indicators of solvency and liquidity, with a focus on governance infrastructures.
Dependent variable Africa Latin America
ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Intercept 18.464
(24.03)***
18.870
(24.22)***
19.068
(23.59)***
18.864
(10.53)***
18.785
(10.24)***
18.937
(9.96)***
7.799
(9.58)***
7.833
(9.70)***
7.756
(9.48)***
9.649
(5.08)***
9.297
(5.08)***
9.371
(5.05)***
Lag inflation 0.054
(2.15)**
0.049
(2.02)**
0.040
(1.54)
−0.007
(-0.12)
−0.002
(−0.04)
−0.009
(−0.15)
−0.026
(−0.26)
−0.028
(−0.28)
−0.025
(−0.25)
−0.228
(−0.98)
−0.225
(−0.99)
−0.227
(−0.99)
Exports −0.699
(−2.25)**
−0.688
(−2.23)**
−0.705
(−2.29)**
−3.229
(−4.36)***
−3.220
(−4.35)***
−3.229
(−4.35)***
−1.864
(−4.08)***
−1.859
(−4.10)***
−1.928
(−4.14)***
−0.551
(−0.52)
−1.039
(−1.01)
−0.972
(−0.92)
Consumption imports 0.638
(2.67)***
0.641
(2.71)***
0.639
(2.70)***
1.350
(2.33)**
1.355
(2.34)**
1.350
(2.33)**
2.432
(5.23)***
2.457
(5.24)***
2.530
(5.25)***
−1.143
(−1.05)
−0.432
(−0.41)
−0.503
(−0.46)
Lag GDP growth 0.002
(0.48)
0.001
(0.22)
0.001
(0.33)
0.003
(0.30)
0.003
(0.25)
0.003
(0.29)
−0.002
(−0.94)
−0.003
(−1.01)
−0.002
(−0.92)
0.002
(0.35)
0.003
(0.46)
0.002
(0.42)
Log investment −0.724
(−7.71)***
−0.755
(−8.01)***
−0.759
(−8.04)***
−0.437
(−1.97)**
−0.439
(−1.95)***
−0.442
(−1.95)***
−0.437
(−2.61)**
−0.422
(−2.47)**
−0.397
(−2.27)**
−0.512
(−1.31)
−0.229
(−0.59)
−0.253
(−0.64)
Log consumption −1.128
(−9.63)***
−1.133
(−9.90)***
−1.154
(−9.89)***
−1.651
(−6.00)***
−1.638
(−6.03)***
−1.654
(−5.97)***
−0.319
(−1.66)*
−0.335
(−1.72)*
−0.356
(−1.80)*
−0.333
(−0.74)
−0.593
(−1.34)
−0.573
(−1.28)
Relative interest rate −0.357
(−2.73)***
−0.379
(−2.92)***
−0.371
(−2.85)***
0.365
(1.18)
0.357
(1.16)
0.363
(1.17)
0.016
(0.30)
0.021
(0.39)
0.016
(0.03)
−0.234
(−1.88)*
−0.240
(−2.00)**
−0.235
(−1.93)**
Terms of trade −0.309
(−4.44)***
−0.313
(−4.54)***
−0.312
(−4.52)***
0.533
(3.28)***
0.532
(3.28)***
0.532
(3.27)***
0.323
(4.38)***
0.320
(4.41)***
0.333
(4.44)***
−0.358
(−2.08)**
−0.281
(−1.71)*
−0.293
(−1.72)*
Exchange rate −0.087
(−2.33)**
−0.084
(−2.27)**
−0.082
(−2.21)**
−0.017
(−0.20)
−0.019
(−0.22)
−0.017
(−0.19)
0.189
(2.29)**
0.170
(2.35)**
0.199
(2.38)**
−0.210
(−1.09)
−0.115
(−0.70)
−0.143
(−0.75)
Legal 0.048
(0.57)
−0.099
(−0.93)
−0.061
(−0.31)
−0.078
(−0.13)
0.011
(0.23)
0.044
(0.69)
−0.261
(−2.34)**
−0.043
(−0.30)
Political 0.163
(2.12)**
0.219
(2.25)**
−0.017
(−0.10)
0.026
(0.12)
−0.028
(−0.44)
−0.067
(−0.79)
−0.480
(−3.31)***
−0.442
(−2.28)**
Observations 276 276 276 271 271 271 103 103 103 103 103 103
F(H0: ui = 0) 35.83*** 36.81*** 36.64*** 13.41*** 13.03*** 12.74*** 22.63*** 26.46*** 22.52*** 11.49*** 14.87*** 11.88***
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Table 3 (Continued)
Dependent variable East Asia All 39 countries
ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Intercept 11.680
(8.73)***
12.375
(9.31)***
11.540
(8.59)***
11.597
(6.90)***
11.764
(7.38)***
11.798
(7.02)***
16.028
(25.61)***
15.903
(25.25)***
16.282
(25.47)***
15.995
(12.44)***
15.783
(12.28)***
15.640
(11.89)***
Lag inflation 0.611
(1.71)*
0.660
(1.79)*
0.560
(1.55)
0.300
(0.67)
0.369
(0.83)
0.373
(0.83)
0.048
(2.05)**
0.058
(2.54)**
0.041
(1.76)*
0.027
(0.56)
0.029
(0.63)
0.036
(0.74)
Exports −0.361
(−0.55)
−0.104
(−0.16)
−0.487
(−0.73)
−1.870
(−2.27)**
−1.704
(−2.14)**
−1.688
(−2.02)**
−0.816
(−3.25)***
−0.780
(−3.09)***
−0.802
(−3.20)***
−2.948
(−5.62)***
−2.977
(−5.68)***
−2.970
(−5.66)***
Consumption imports 0.252
(0.40)
0.001
(0.00)
0.285
(0.25)
1.198
(1.51)
1.162
(1.52)
1.150
(1.45)
0.802
(3.82)***
0.808
(3.82)***
0.813
(3.88)***
1.429
(3.19)***
1.414
(3.17)***
1.413
(3.16)***
Lag GDP growth 0.006
(0.83)
0.006
(0.84)
0.004
(0.57)
0.007
(0.75)
0.009
(1.02)
0.009
(1.01)
0.002
(0.72)
0.002
(0.63)
0.002
(0.57)
0.008
(1.26)
0.008
(1.35)
0.008
(1.36)
Log investment −0.388
(−1.46)
−0.263
(−0.96)
−0.352
(−1.32)
−0.249
(−0.75)
−0.305
(−0.93)
−0.301
(−0.90)
−0.641
(−7.59)***
−0.661
(−7.68)***
−0.667
(−7.81)***
−0.408
(−2.32)**
−0.373
(−2.09)**
−0.371
(−2.08)**
Log consumption −0.696
(−2.45)**
−0.853
(−2.92)***
−0.739
(−2.57)**
−0.646
(−1.81)*
−0.580
(−1.66)*
−0.585
(−1.63)
−0.910
(−9.20)***
−0.876
(−8.86)***
−0.907
(−9.20)***
−1.226
(−5.98)***
−1.243
(6.11)***
−1.232
(−6.01)***
Relative interest rate −0.212
(−2.17)**
−0.197
(−1.95)**
−0.203
(−2.08)**
−0.143
(−1.17)
−0.156
(−1.28)
−0.155
(−1.27)
−0.055
(−0.76)
−0.070
(−0.96)
−0.059
(−0.83)
0.156
(1.05)
0.166
(1.13)
0.163
(1.10)
Terms of trade 0.405
(1.31)
0.225
(0.73)
0.403
(1.31)
0.327
(0.84)
0.337
(0.91)
0.329
(0.85)
−0.172
(−3.02)***
−0.162
(−2.84)***
−0.181
(−3.19)***
0.292
(2.50)**
0.298
(2.56)**
0.305
(2.61)**
Exchange rate 0.113
(0.58)
0.037
(0.18)
0.229
(1.02)
−0.952
(−3.87)***
−1.109
(−4.36)***
−1.117
(−4.00)***
−0.040
(−1.19)
−0.030
(−0.90)
−0.042
(−1.25)
−0.092
(−1.33)
−0.094
(−1.36)
−0.089
(−1.29)
Legal 0.263
(1.90)**
0.
377
(2.16)**
0.149
(0.86)
−0.016
(−0.07)
−0.116
(−2.11)**
−0.187
(−2.79)***
−0.029
(−0.26)
0.071
(0.52)
Political 0.031
(0.32)
−0.127
(−1.07)
−0.176
(−1.51)
0.183
(1.22)
0.015
(0.26)
0.131
(1.84)*
−0.140
(−1.18)
−0.184
(−1.26)
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68 447 447 447 442 442 442
F(H0: ui = 0) 11.99*** 10.28*** 11.07*** 10.53*** 11.31*** 11.07*** 30.42*** 30.21*** 30.69*** 13.18*** 13.23*** 13.16***
The column heading ETD/GDP represents the ratio of debt stock to GDP (the solvency proxy); SETD/RES is the logarithm of short-term external debt to reserves ratio (the liquidity proxy). The Z-stats are in
parentheses.
* Significance levels of 10%.
** Significance levels of 5%.
*** Significance levels of 1%.
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olicy and governance variables. There is a strong correlation
etween the legal and political variables (correlation results are
ot reported here); thus, the two variables are first entered sep-
rately in different models. Column (1) reports results of the
odel which includes the legal variable; column (2) reports
esults of the model which includes the political variable; and
olumn (3) reports results of the model containing all variables.
e estimate the model using both the fixed effects and the 2SLS
nstrumental variables regression.10 Even though both methods
ield similar results in terms of coefficients and signs, we report
he result for the fixed effects method. The results for the 2SLS
nstrumental variables regression can be provided upon request.
Given that most of the signs and significance of variables
o not change after separating the legal and political variable,
esults of column (3) are discussed. Most of the estimated param-
ters for Africa, Latin America and all countries combined
ad the expected signs. For Africa, a rise in export earnings,
mported investments and household consumptions significantly
mprove both solvency and liquidity whilst consumption imports
orsen solvency and liquidity. Using the solvency indicator,
1% increase in exports reduces debt to GDP ratio by about
.71%. Likewise, a 1% increase in imported investments and
ousehold consumptions lead to a fall in debt to GDP ratio by
bout 0.76% and 1.15%, respectively. Surprisingly, an improve-
ent in the political environment increases debt to GDP ratio by
.22%. Using the liquidity indicator, a 1% increase in exports
eads to about 3.23% decrease in short-term debt to international
eserves ratio whilst imported investments and household con-
umptions reduces short-term debt to reserve ratio by 0.44% and
.65%, respectively.
Conversely, consumption imports worsen both the solvency
nd the liquidity levels. Specifically, a 1% increase in consump-
ion imports increases debt as a percentage of GDP by about
.64%. The relative interest rate and the exchange rate signifi-
antly improve solvency and insignificantly affect liquidity. On
he other hand, terms of trade significantly improve solvency
ut significantly worsen liquidity. Macroeconomic instability
computed as inflation rate volatility) worsens solvency but
nsignificantly improves liquidity.
As in Africa, a rise in export earnings, imported investments
nd household consumptions significantly improve solvency
hilst consumption imports worsen it in Latin America. The
elative interest rate and an improvement in the political envi-
onment improve liquidity. Unlike in Africa where terms of trade
mprove solvency and worsen liquidity, in Latin America, terms
f trade significantly improve liquidity and significantly worsen
olvency. In East Asia, household consumptions and the relative
nterest rate significantly reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio whilst
xports and the exchange rate significantly improve liquidity.
When all countries are pooled together, inflation and con-
umption imports worsen solvency. On the other hand, exports,
10 Note that the panel is unbalanced with an average of 12 observations per
anel and 24 panels for Africa. This means that the random effects method yields
nconsistent estimates since the error term is correlated with other regressors in
he model.
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mported investments, household consumptions, terms of trade,
nd improvement in the legal environment significantly improve
olvency. For liquidity, consumption imports and terms of trade
ignificantly worsen its proxy (short term debt to reserves ratio)
hilst exports, imported investments and household consump-
ions significantly improve it.
.3. Results and discussion of HIPC vis-à-vis non-HIPC
ased tests
The results for the regression of debt sustainability against
overnance infrastructure indicators for HIPCs and non-HIPCs
re reported in Table 4. Just as in the analysis in the preced-
ng section, the legal and political variables are first entered
eparately in different models. Column (1) reports results of
he model which includes the legal variable; column (2) reports
esults of the model which includes the political variable; and
olumn (3) reports results of the model containing all variables.
gain, we estimate the model using both the fixed effects and
he 2SLS instrumental variables regression but only the result
f the fixed effects method is presented.
Results of column (3) are discussed. For HIPCs, lagged infla-
ion, consumption imports and an improvement in the political
nvironment positively and significantly increase the debt-to-
DP ratio (increase in insolvency). On the other hand, exports,
mported investments, household consumption, relative inter-
st rate, terms of trade, and depreciation of the exchange rate
egatively and significantly reduce debt-to-GDP ratio. For non-
IPCs, it is only consumption imports that significantly increase
ebt-to-GDP ratio (i.e., worsen insolvency) whilst imported
nvestments and household consumptions reduce debt-to-GDP
atio.
Regarding short-term debt to reserves ratio (liquidity indi-
ator), for HIPCs, only terms of trade increase the short-term
ebt to GDP levels. Only household consumptions significantly
educe illiquidity. For non-HIPCs, only consumption imports
orsen illiquidity whilst exports and household consumptions
ignificantly improve it.
.4. Further assessment of governance infrastructure on
ebt management
To analyze the relative impact of exports and imports vis-
-vis the institutional and policy variables on indebtedness
ndicators of solvency and liquidity, Asiedu (2006) provides
useful analytical guide. Imports and exports are selected
s pivotal variables for this further exploration because they
oth play a significant role in determining both solvency and
iquidity for African countries. Note that exports improve sol-
ency and liquidity whilst imports worsen them (recall results in
ables 2 and 3). Latin America and East Asia, where countries
ave evidently managed their external debt more sustainably
han African countries (recall Fig. A1), are used as regional
enchmark. Column (3) reports the estimated coefficients for
ll countries combined (see Table 3). Columns (4) and (5) show
he equivalent effects of a change in policy and institutional
nvironment on exports and imports, respectively.
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Table 4
Solvency and liquidity indicators for HIPC and non-HIPC African countries.
Dependent variable ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio
HIPC NON-HIPC HIPC NON-HIPC
Independent variables 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Intercept 22.571
(26.91)***
23.185
(27.19)***
23.111
(26.65)***
8.088
(7.64)***
8.011
(7.78)***
8.366
(7.64)***
19.259
(8.32)***
19.227
(8.07)***
19.130
(7.88)***
14.883
(4.36)***
14.849
(4.44)***
15.156
(4.28)***
Inflation 0.090
(2.86)***
0.071
(2.27)**
0.074
(2.31)**
0.099
(1.77)*
0.099
(1.77)*
0.083
(1.44)
0.090
(1.03)
0.089
(1.02)
0.094
(1.04)
0.030
(0.17)
0.028
(0.16)
0.014
(0.07)
Exports −1.864
(−4.43)***
−1.864
(−4.53)***
−1.834
(−4.40)***
−0.461
(−1.19)
−0.521
(−1.34)
−0.505
(−1.30)
−1.755
(−1.50)
−1.798
(−1.55)
−1.760
(−1.50)
−3.485
(−2.71)***
−3.541
(−2.75)***
−3.516
(−2.70)***
Consumption imports 0.993
(3.39)***
1.010
(3.49)***
1.003
(3.46)***
1.495
(4.45)***
1.470
(4.32)***
1.412
(4.08)***
0.304
(0.36)
0.307
(0.36)
0.299
(0.35)
2.483
(2.28)**
2.445
(2.20)**
2.384
(2.09)**
GDP growth 0.001
(0.29)
0.001
(0.17)
0.001
(0.14)
0.002
(0.26)
0.0002
(0.04)
0.001
(0.13)
0.009
(0.61)
0.009
(0.64)
0.009
(0.62)
−0.015
(−0.82)
−0.017
(−0.88)
−0.016
(−0.85)
Log investment −0.592
(−5.52)***
−0.657
(−6.05)***
−0.651
(−5.94)***
−0.290
(−2.12)**
−0.264
(−1.90)***
−0.265
(−1.91)***
−0.411
(−1.36)
−0.404
(−1.30)
−0.396
(−1.26)
−0.523
(−1.21)
−0.496
(−1.13)
−0.496
(−1.12)
Log consumption −1.606
(−11.55)***
−1.612
(−11.78)***
−1.606
(−11.67)***
−0.610
(−4.70)***
−0.624
(−4.64)***
−0.664
(−4.72)***
−1.691
(−4.36)***
−1.700
(−4.40)***
−1.692
(−4.35)***
−1.202
(−2.90)***
−1.222
(−2.85)***
−1.258
(−2.80)***
Relative interest rate −0.584
(−4.08)***
−0.618
(−4.35)***
−0.620
(−4.35)***
−0.072
(−0.47)
−0.073
(−0.48)
−0.061
(−0.40)
0.535
(1.35)
0.547
(1.37)
0.544
(1.36)
−0.083
(−0.16)
−0.085
(−0.17)
−0.075
(−0.15)
Terms of trade −0.241
(−3.81)***
−0.246
(−3.95)***
−0.249
(−3.97)***
0.001
(0.01)
0.027
(0.19)
0.019
(0.13)
0.326
(1.86)*
0.331
(1.90)*
0.328
(1.86)*
0.631
(1.30)
0.654
(1.35)
0.644
(1.31)
Exchange rate −0.104
(−1.96)**
−0.082
(−1.64)*
−0.090
(−1.70)*
−0.137
(−1.80)*
−0.116
(−1.46)
−0.113
(−1.42)
0.084
(0.58)
0.090
(0.64)
0.081
(0.55)
−0.249
(−1.04)
−0.228
(−0.91)
−0.225
(−0.89)
Legal 0.223
(2.18)**
−0.061
(−0.48)
−0.043
(−0.44)
−0.119
(−0.96)
0.041
(0.15)
0.080
(0.23)
−0.030
(0.10)
−0.111
(−0.28)
Political 0.246
(3.04)***
0.217
(2.14)**
0.151
(1.00)
0.151
(1.00)
−0.014
(−0.06)
−0.052
(−0.18)
0.076
(0.20)
0.160
(0.33)
Observations 199 199 199 78 78 78 197 197 197 75 75 75
F(H0: ui = 0) 53.56*** 57.75*** 54.66*** 12.44*** 12.70*** 12.36*** 11.65*** 11.78*** 11.40*** 8.25*** 8.43*** 8.14***
ETD/GDP represents the ratio of debt stock to GDP (the solvency proxy); SETD/RES is short-term external debt to reserves ratio (the liquidity proxy). The Z-stats are in parentheses.
* Significance levels of 10%.
** Significance levels of 5%.
*** Significance levels of 1%.
S. Muhanji, K. Ojah / Review of Development Finance 1 (2011) 184–206 197
Table 5
Estimated equivalent effect of a change in institutional and policy variables vis-à-vis exports and consumption imports for Africa and Latin America.
Africa Latin America Estimated
coefficienta
Equivalent effect on
Exportsb, % Consumption
importsc, %
ETD/GDP
Political −0.674 −0.068 0.131 9.90 −9.76
Legal −0.724 −0.104 0.187 14.46 −14.26
GDP growth 3.397 3.206 0.002 −0.05 0.05
Relative interest rate 0.499 0.377 0.059 −0.90 0.89
Exchange rate 1.089 −0.105 0.042 −6.25 6.17
Log investments 8.995 9.699 0.667 58.55 −57.76
SETD/RES
Political −0.674 −0.068 0.289 5.90 −12.39
Legal −0.724 −0.104 0.190 3.97 −8.33
GDP growth 3.397 3.206 0.037 −0.24 0.50
Relative interest rate 0.499 0.377 0.070 −0.29 0.60
Exchange rate 1.089 −0.105 0.122 −4.90 1.03
Log investments 8.995 9.699 0.371 8.79 −18.48
a These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients for political and legal variables from columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.
b The equivalent effect of a change in the political environment from the level of Africa to that of Latin America is given by (−0.674 + 0.068) × 0.131/−0.802,
where −0.802 is the estimated coefficient for exports for all the 39 countries.
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ic The equivalent effect of a change in the legal environment from the level of
.813 is the estimated coefficient for consumption imports for all the 39 countri
Focusing on the indebtedness indicator of solvency
ETD/GDP), results show that an improvement in the politi-
al environment of Africa to the level of Latin America has
he same effect as increasing exports by about 9.9% and reduc-
ng consumption imports by about 9.8% (as reported in row
of Table 5). Likewise, an improvement in the legal infras-
ructure from that of Africa to that of Latin America is similar
o increasing exports by about 14.5% and reducing consump-
ion imports by about 14.3%. An increase in growth rate of
DP from Africa’s level to that of Latin America has the same
ffect as reducing exports and increasing consumption imports
y about 0.05%, which makes sense given that Africa’s growth
ate for this period had been greater than Latin America’s growth
ate. An increase in imported investments from Africa’s level to
hat of Latin America is similar to increasing exports by 58.6%
nd reducing consumption imports by 57.8%. The simultaneous
ncrease in exports and fall in consumption imports, in turn, is
xpected to translate into a fall in debt-to-GDP ratio, and hence
mproves GDP.
A noteworthy result in Table 5 is that of the exchange rate.
atin American countries overvalued their exchange rates and
herefore an appreciation of the exchange rate from the level
f Africa to that of Latin America is comparable to reducing
xports by about 6.3% and increasing consumption imports by
bout 6.2%. Overvaluation of the exchange rate causes an exter-
al imbalance that leads to debt accumulation. It discourages
romotion of the export sector, which in turn impedes external
ebt servicing.
Using the indebtedness measure of liquidity (SETD/RES),
esults show that an improvement of the political environment
rom that of Africa to that of Latin America is comparable to an
ncrease in exports by about 5.9% and a decrease in imports of
bout 12.4%. Similarly, an improvement in the reliability of the
s
t
aa to that of Latin America is given by (−0.724 + 0.104) × 0.187/0.813, where
egal environment from Africa’s level to Latin America’s level
as the same effect as an increase in exports by about 4% and
decrease in imports by about 8.3%. An increase in imported
nvestments from Africa’s level to that of Latin America is sim-
lar to an increase in exports of about 8.8% and a decrease in
onsumption imports by about 18.5%. An appreciation of the
xchange rate is similar to reducing exports by about 4.9% and
ncreasing consumption imports by about 1.0%. In terms of liq-
idity, an overvalued exchange rate has a far more detrimental
ffect on the export sector than on the import sector.
Table 6 shows the equivalent effects of changes in policy
nd institutional variables on exports and imports for Africa
elative to East Asia. As in Table 5, columns (1) and (2) report
he average values of the institutional and policy variables for
frica and Asia. Column (3) reports the estimated coefficients
or all countries combined (again, see Table 3). Columns (4)
nd (5) show the equivalent effects of changes in policy and
nstitutional environments on exports and imports, respectively.
Results show that a change in political institutions from
frica’s standards to East Asia’s standards is similar to increas-
ng exports by about 9.2% and reducing imports by about 9.0%.
n improvement in the legal institutions from that of Africa to
hat of East Asia is similar to increasing exports by about 18.3%
nd reducing consumption imports by about 18.1%. Some of
he major reasons as to why Asian countries managed their debt
etter is their export promotion and exchange rate management
olicies. If African countries adjust their exchange rate to the
evel of Asia, exports would increase by about 5.1% and con-
umption imports would reduce by about 5%. An increase in
mported investments from that of Africa to East Asia is the
ame as increasing exports by 104.4% and reducing consump-
ion imports by 103.0%. This is by far the most telling variable,
nd it reflects the empirical regularity of East Asia’s notoriety in
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Table 6
Estimated equivalent effect of a change in policy and institutional variables vis-à-vis exports and consumption imports for Africa and East Asia.
Africa East Asia Estimated
coefficienta
Equivalent effect on
Exportsb, % Consumption
importsc, %
ETD/GDP
Political −0.674 −0.111 0.131 9.20 −9.07
Legal −0.724 0.061 0.187 18.30 −18.06
GDP growth 3.397 5.894 0.002 0.62 −0.61
Relative interest rate 0.499 0.696 0.059 1.45 −1.43
Exchange rate 1.089 2.056 0.042 5.06 −5.00
Log investments 8.995 10.251 0.667 104.46 −103.04
SETD/RES
Political −0.674 −0.111 0.184 3.49 −7.33
Legal −0.724 0.061 0.071 1.88 −3.94
GDP growth 3.397 5.894 0.008 0.67 −1.41
Relative interest rate 0.499 0.696 0.163 1.08 −2.27
Exchange rate 1.089 2.056 0.089 2.90 −6.09
Log investments 8.995 10.251 0.371 15.70 −32.98
a These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients for institutional and policy variables from regressions of all countries combined that are reported in
Table 3.
b The equivalent effect of a change in political environment from the level of Africa to that of East Asia is given by (−0.674 + 0.111) × 0.131/−0.802, where
−0.802 is the estimated coefficient for exports for all the 39 countries.
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ic The equivalent effect of a change in political environment from the level of
s the estimated coefficient for consumption imports for all the 39 countries.
rocess technology building which, in turn, fosters their exem-
lary economic growth and its attendant capacity for better debt
anagement.
Using the liquidity model, a stable political environmentsimilar to that of Asia) is the same as increasing Africa’s
xports by about 3.5% and reducing its imports by about 7.3%.
n improvement in the reliability of the legal institutions from
A
b
l
able 7
stimated equivalent effect of a change in policy and institutional variables vis-à-vis
HIPC Non-HIPC
TD/GDP
olitical −0.689 −0.638
egal −0.709 −0.760
DP growth 3.054 3.837
elative interest rate 0.480 0.547
xchange rate 1.450 0.216
og investments 8.690 9.243
ETD/RES
olitical −0.689 −0.638
egal −0.709 −0.760
DP growth 3.054 3.837
elative interest rate 0.480 0.547
xchange rate 1.450 0.216
og investments 8.690 9.243
a These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients for institutional and p
eported in Table 3.
b The equivalent effect of a change in political environment from the level of HIP
0.705 is the estimated coefficient for exports for all the 24 African countries.
c The equivalent effect of a change in political environment from the level of HIPC
s the estimated coefficient for consumption imports for all the 24 African countries.to that of East Asia is given by (−0.724 − 0.061) × 0.187/0.813, where 0.813
he level of Africa to that of East Asia is equivalent to increasing
xports by about 1.9% and reducing consumption imports by
bout 3.9%. Additionally, adjusting the exchange rate level
rom that of Africa to that of East Asia is the same as increasing
frica’s exports by 2.9% and reducing its consumption imports
y about 6.1%. Adjusting Africa’s currency value to East Asia’s
evel would have a more positive effect in terms of promoting
exports and consumption imports for Africa’s HIPC and non-HIPC countries.
Estimated
coefficienta
Equivalent effect on
Exportsb, % Consumption
importsc, %
0.219 1.58 −1.75
0.099 −0.72 0.79
0.001 0.11 −0.12
0.371 3.53 −3.89
0.081 −14.18 15.64
0.759 59.53 −65.68
0.026 0.04 −0.10
0.078 −0.12 0.62
0.003 0.07 −0.17
0.363 0.75 −0.02
0.017 −0.65 1.55
0.442 7.57 −18.11
olicy variables from regressions of all 24 African countries combined that are
C to that of Non-HIPC is given by (−0.689 + 0.638) × 0.219/−0.705, where
to that of Non-HIPC is given by (−0.709 + 0.760) × 0.099/0.639, where 0.639
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xports. Increasing imported investments from the level of
frica to that of East Asia is similar to increasing exports by
5.7% and reducing imports by 33.0%.
Table 7 shows the equivalent effects of changes in policy and
nstitutional variables on exports and imports for Africa’s HIPCs
elative to its non-HIPCs. As in Table 5, columns (1) and (2)
eport the average values of the institutional and policy variables
or Africa. Column (3) reports the estimated coefficients for all
frican countries combined (again, see Table 4). Columns (4)
nd (5) show the equivalent effects of changes in policy and
nstitutional variables on exports and imports, respectively.
Results show that a change in the political environment from
hat of HIPCs to that of non-HIPCs increases exports by about
.58% and reduces imports by about 1.75%. Depreciation of
xchange rate was part of the requirements for HIPCs to qual-
fy for external debt relief. Most non-HIPC countries maintain
trong currencies and hence, an appreciation of the exchange rate
rom the level of HIPCs to that of non-HIPCs reduces exports
y about 14.2% and increases consumption imports by about
5.6%. On imported investments, if HIPCs increase their invest-
ents to the level of non-HIPCs, their exports would increase by
bout 59.5% whilst their consumption imports would decrease
y about 65.7%. This effect is by far greater than effects of other
actors.
Apart from the exchange rate and the legal environment vari-
bles (both of which are mandated by the “conditionality” of
IPC), non-HIPCs are exemplary to HIPCs in all other debt
anagement determinants. This set of results from the HIPCs
ersus non-HIPCs divide suggests that more indebted countries
hould be keener adherers of the kind of prudent debt manage-
ent guides highlighted in this study. (Note that the summary
tatistics of variables used for these equivalent effects analysis
re reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.)
. Conclusions
This paper derives sustainable external debt thresholds that
re argued to be appropriate for African economies. It identi-
es external shocks that are characteristically linked to external
ebt accumulation and ramifications of debt accumulation. It
mportantly provides concrete measures of debt management
ains that are possible were African countries to adopt best
ractices in debt relevant macroeconomic management and
overnance infrastructure provision from other regions of the
orld’s emerging economies. The empirical results of the paper
rovide encouraging guides on possible effective ways of aid-
ng African countries to operate at sustainable levels of external
ebt.
Derived sustainable external debt thresholds are substantially
elow levels that have hitherto been recommended by world
evelopment agencies such as IMF and the World Bank (par-
icularly via the HIPC): that is, computed and recommended
ebt-to-GDP ratio of 80%, debt-to-exports ratio of 60% and
hort-term debt to reserves ratio of 80%, respectively, are less
Apment Finance 1 (2011) 184–206 199
han corresponding HIPC-recommended ratios of 250%, 150%
nd 130%. Levels of external indebtedness above these thresh-
lds computed in this paper tend to yield negative economic
rowth for African countries.
Improving African countries’ governance infrastructures
political and legal) and macro-management practices to the
tandards of East Asian emerging market economies would see
frican countries reduce their external debt levels considerably.
imilar gains would accrue were African countries to adopt
overnance infrastructures of South American emerging mar-
et economies, but not their macroeconomic management style.
n other words, African countries in the context of prudential
scal stewardship should not exceed a debt-to-GDP ratio of
0% and short-term debt to international reserves ratio of 80%.
hese results imply that beyond this level, African countries
ust reduce foreign borrowing since such level of debt exceeds
ountries’ wealth and capacity to service their debt without
amstringing other aspects of their wellbeing.
Growing exports and a stable political environment promote
oth solvency and liquidity for African countries. Conversely,
mports (particularly consumption types) worsen liquidity and
olvency. Since African countries must import capital (inter-
ediate) goods for investment purposes, they should reduce
mport of consumption goods and rather boost imports of invest-
ent goods. Investment goods are necessary if countries export
nished goods or export goods with value-added, instead of
xporting just primary goods.
Furthermore, for African countries to appropriately manage
heir debts, they would be wise to adopt some of the reasoned
nd better policies pursued by East Asian countries, especially
he export promotion policies. But these policies can only be
ffective if countries adopt better governance institutions and
xchange rate management strategies. What comes out clearly
rom the analyses of this study, as reported in Tables 5 and 6,
s that a stable political and legal environment plays a key role
n determining the level of exports and consumption imports in
frica. In fact, a stable political environment and effective legal
nstitutions play a key role in boosting exports whilst reducing
mports, both of which in turn reduce external debt.
In closing, some caveats are appropriate. The model used to
erive sustainable external debt thresholds in this study is essen-
ially static. Therefore, policy makers must be cognizant of the
ynamic nature of their economies and thus, commit to comput-
ng these thresholds periodically as their economies, hopefully,
rogress. Furthermore, note that though the upper caps of the
stimated thresholds have been highlighted, the results are in
anges. This range estimate of relevant thresholds implies that
ountries in regional groupings are not necessarily homogenous;
herefore, each country needs to place itself appropriately within
ange estimates for their region.ppendix A.
Tables A1 and A2, Fig. A1.
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Table A1
Debt indicators for selected African countries (1980–2008).
Country Debt indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Angola ETD/GDP 125 135 119 114 78.5 83.7 73.8 174 200
ETD/XGS 349 349 366 346 232 215 244 253 372
ETD/GNI 93.7 105 91.3 287 327
Burkina Faso ETD/GDP 17.1 18.5 20.1 24.9 28.1 33 31.4 34.9 32.3 27.4 26.8 30.8 46.3 47.8
ETD/XGS 191 199 245 315 256 333 349 307 294 313 245 294 523 534
ETD/GNI 17.2 18.6 20.2 25 28.2 33.1 31.5 35 32.5 27.5 26.9 30.9 46.4 48.1
Cameroon ETD/GDP 38.2 34.6 38.2 39.2 37.1 38.7 38.9 37.2 38.5 48.1 58.8 54.4 65.9 56.7
ETD/XGS 137 158 115 129 111 116 167 223 240 232 291 272 321 350
ETD/GNI 45.8 38.5 40.8 41.7 38.5 40.1 39.5 37.8 38.7 49.1 61.5 58.1 69.9 60
Congo, Republic ETD/GDP 88.4 71.7 88.5 94.6 92.2 139 189 186 183 177 176 175 160 260
ETD/XGS 147 124 160 163 150 244 474 445 450 365 327 389 374 587
ETD/GNI 97.6 76 93.8 102 97.2 147 185 182 211 208 211 209 184 302
Côte d’Ivoire ETD/GDP 73.3 96.5 118 130 125 138 125 135 130 152 160 173 166 173
ETD/XGS 210 274 325 351 276 296 317 403 427 474 504 577 521 586
ETD/GNI 77.1 103 128 144 135 153 135 148 143 177 187 199 189 197
Gabon ETD/GDP 35.4 29.4 27.7 27 25.8 36.1 57.1 79.8 74.2 80 66.9 78.2 68.8 88.2
ETD/XGS 54.7 46.4 44.9 44 43.7 57.7 162 187 202 175 145 165 149 181
ETD/GNI 39.3 32.1 30.3 29.5 27.5 39 61.6 86.2 80 84.8 74.6 87.1 79.1 103
The Gambia ETD/GDP 56.7 80.5 95.9 99.2 130 109 146 148 122 119 116 121 116 116
ETD/XGS 133 183 216 197 254 248 313 300 242 216 194 190 184 200
ETD/GNI 57.7 81.8 98.8 106 129 112 172 144 120 126 127 126 118 118
Ghana ETD/GDP 31.5 36.4 36.8 41.1 44.4 49.8 48 64.7 58.8 62.8 63.4 63 66.1 76.7
ETD/XGS 372 766 1102 739 552 467 289 329 324 375 376 371 384 379
ETD/GNI 31.7 36.6 36.9 41.4 44.9 50.7 49 66.5 60.4 64.2 64.7 64.2 67.2 78.2
Kenya ETD/GDP 46.6 47.1 52.4 60.7 56.7 68.1 63.6 72.6 69.5 71.2 82.1 91.4 83.9 124
ETD/XGS 158 155 196 234 212 269 246 341 311 309 320 338 320 318
ETD/GNI 48.1 48.6 54.5 62.7 58.6 70.6 65.8 75.2 72.3 73.4 85.8 95.8 87.7 132
Lesotho ETD/GDP 16.7 19.5 30.4 30.8 37.8 60.5 61.1 65.7 63.1 68.1 68.6 69.5 65.1 71.5
ETD/XGS 79.4 101 192 218 262 430 434 538 319 336 404 393 339 318
ETD/GNI 10.4 11.7 16.4 16.1 19.8 33.7 34.2 35.4 36.1 40.9 42.2 43.9 43.4 49.7
Liberia ETD/GDP 71.9 87 94.2 111 116 134 167 190 177 238 535 626 968 1385
ETD/XGS 112 138 167 207 229 268 334
ETD/GNI 71.9 87 94.2 111 116 134 167 190 177 238 535 626 968 1385
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Table A1 (Continued)
Country Debt indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Angola ETD/GDP 278 228 140 130 167 167 103 94.4 76.4 62.3 47.3 38.6 21 19.4 17.8
ETD/XGS 326 201 170 190 294 194 115 123 104 89.5 67.9 48.7 28.4 25.8 23.6
ETD/GNI 581 312 179 155 206 218 126 114 89.3 71.1 54.1 44.4 23.9 22.8 21.5
Burkina Faso ETD/GDP 59.7 53.4 50.2 53.2 52 52.5 54.5 53.1 46.9 40.5 38.9 36.7 19.5 21.5 21.2
ETD/XGS 420 378 475 492 406 552 600 574 531 461 363 368 169 301 321
ETD/GNI 60.1 53.6 50.1 53.2 52.1 52.6 54.6 53.2 46.9 40.5 39 36.9 19.5 21.5 21.2
Cameroon ETD/GDP 100 125 113 108 115 101 102 99.1 90.5 79.9 65.2 43.8 18 14.2 11.9
ETD/XGS 475 531 485 505 538 468 440 452 454 395 336 214 78.2 64.6 40.4
ETD/GNI 107 133 121 115 121 105 109 104 96.5 83.2 67 45.1 18.3 14.9 12.2
Congo, Republic ETD/GDP 300 278 202 213 257 209 149 157 167 154 135 95.5 90.6 78 51.1
ETD/XGS 512 430 293 282 336 289 185 203 205 191 168 113 108 93.5 65
ETD/GNI 350 479 352 298 338 299 210 225 230 210 208 152 129 112 77.3
Côte d’Ivoire ETD/GDP 209 172 161 133 116 105 117 110 103 88.6 85.3 72.8 73.5 70 53.6
ETD/XGS 516 411 391 321 295 260 288 263 205 193 176 143 140 146 115
ETD/GNI 231 189 174 142 124 112 125 117 109 93.5 89.4 76.2 76.9 73.3 56
Gabon ETD/GDP 99.5 87.9 75.7 80.4 98.8 85.5 77 72.6 71.2 61.9 56.6 44.7 43.9 24.6 16.3
ETD/XGS 161 148 121 131 208 143 112 123 133 112 90.9 69.1 70.8 39.5 24.5
ETD/GNI 113 102 87.4 92.8 112 97.3 91 83.7 78.8 70.2 67.8 50.3 53 28.3 17.6
The Gambia ETD/GDP 117 112 115 104 110 108 115 117 156 173 168 145 143 112 55.8
ETD/XGS 267 228 244 230 216 234 239 325 367 402 365 363 359 339 186
ETD/GNI 118 113 117 106 116 113 121 124 166 189 184 160 158 122 57.8
Ghana ETD/GDP 93.8 85.1 83.6 83 84.4 83.3 123 119 113 99.3 79.5 62.8 25.1 29.9 29.8
ETD/XGS 371 347 260 256 249 260 252 264 265 244 202 172 62.4 74.7 70.3
ETD/GNI 95.7 86.9 85.3 84.6 86.2 85.1 127 122 115 101 81.3 63.6 25.3 30.2 30.1
Kenya ETD/GDP 99.7 80.8 56.6 49.3 48.4 50.2 48.4 42.4 46.5 46 42.9 34.3 29.1 27.2 24.5
ETD/XGS 269 248 224 217 240 241 224 185 187 191 161 120 110 104 89.7
ETD/GNI 105 83.8 57.6 49.9 48.9 50.9 48.9 42.9 47 46.5 43.3 34.3 29.1 27.1 24.4
Lesotho ETD/GDP 77.8 76.9 81.2 73.7 83.4 84.4 85.8 84.1 97.7 70.7 59.4 48.1 42.8 40.6 42.1
ETD/XGS 337 355 287 271 293 294 263 187 168 135 106 94.2 85.7 77 88.9
ETD/GNI 55.1 55.8 59.2 54.4 63.2 64.8 66.5 67.2 78.5 56.3 47.9 39.4 34.2 32.5 33.7
Liberia ETD/GDP 1776 1838 1528 817 715 582 503 556 586 881 835 741 677 502 414
ETD/XGS 9299 6631 3999 2343 2400 2950 2722 2239 1955 2364 1774 1330
ETD/GNI 1776 1838 1528 817 715 582 503 556 586 881 835 741 677 502 414
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Table A1 (Continued)
Country Debt indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Malawi ETD/GDP 67.1 66.4 73.3 72.9 72.8 90.2 97.8 116 98.4 88.6 82.8 75.5 94.9 88.1
ETD/XGS 270 259 326 352 257 373 427 454 422 472 348 324 409 546
ETD/GNI 72.9 71.1 77.9 77.4 76.4 94.6 103 121 102 91.5 84.7 77.1 97 90
Mali ETD/GDP 40.7 55.6 65.9 76.4 94.4 111 104 106 104 106 102 107 102 108
ETD/XGS 277 414 460 473 530 661 678 641 634 636 594 588 660 684
ETD/GNI 41.1 56.9 67.3 78.2 95.9 113 105 107 105 103 107 102 108
Mozambique ETD/GDP 42.6 64.4 66.6 175 199 189 189 175 261 257
ETD/XGS 1029 2252 2638 2639 2464 2293 2309 1724 1996 1987
ETD/GNI 43.3 65.9 68.9 189 211 205 200 186 286 280
Nigeria ETD/GDP 13.9 19.1 24.1 50.2 63.1 65.6 110 124 130 126 117 123 88.7 144
ETD/XGS 47.3 84.6 147 369 425 408 643 433 561 386 270 330 210 305
ETD/GNI 14.6 19.6 24.6 51.2 64.9 68.1 118 138 133 138 131 135 97.5 162
Senegal ETD/GDP 42.1 52.6 59.8 74.7 81.2 86.4 77.1 80.1 78.1 66.7 65.7 63.9 61.4 67
ETD/XGS 176 166 205 212 239 310 314 377 350 273 258 277 275 331
ETD/GNI 43.3 54.5 62.1 77.6 85.2 90.3 80.3 83.4 81.7 69.6 68 66.2 62.7 69.3
Sierra Leone ETD/GDP 42.7 53.1 48.5 64.5 56.4 82.6 177 147 97.1 116 181 160 201 199
ETD/XGS 187 231 308 582 531 557 1487 460 338 483 807 705 897 925
ETD/GNI 43.9 54.5 49.4 66.6 58 85.4 193 154 103 122 203 174 226 211
South Africa ETD/GDP 0.96 1.17 1.53 1.42 1.85 1.84 1.39 1.07 0.92 0.62 0.67 0.63 0.64 1.17
ETD/XGS 2.71 4.14 5.77 5.75 7.27 5.87 4.56 3.54 3.16 2.32 2.78 2.91 2.98 5.22
ETD/GNI 0.96 1.17 1.53 1.42 1.85 1.84 1.39 1.07 0.92 0.62 0.67 0.63 0.64 1.17
Tanzania ETD/GDP 102 97.1 91.9 111 128 142 108 107 118 132 151 132 145 159
ETD/XGS 775 795 1075 1388 1420 2094 1121 1195 1221 1165 1199 1288 1164 883
ETD/GNI 122 138 158 137 151 165
Togo ETD/GDP 98.8 104 116 120 112 123 100 98.9 88.6 86.9 78.6 84.3 79.9 105
ETD/XGS 193 226 231 263 220 253 228 239 203 219 235 252 297 430
ETD/GNI 102 109 122 127 119 129 105 103 91.9 89.6 80.1 86 81.2 107
Uganda ETD/GDP 55.5 52.9 40.2 45 29.7 35.2 36.3 30.9 29.8 41.6 60.5 84.4 103 94.8
ETD/XGS 285 329 479 520 234 256 283 374 394 523 836 1131 1179 1342
ETD/GNI 55.8 53.4 40.6 46 30.1 35.7 36.7 31.1 30.1 42.1 61.6 85.9 107 96.3
Zambia ETD/GDP 83.5 89.9 94.5 113 138 199 338 286 180 164 210 206 211 198
ETD/XGS 202 314 341 343 393 547 803 725 539 612 585 595 578 589
ETD/GNI 90.3 92.5 101 122 154 226 415 337 202 183 230 233 234 215
Zimbabwe ETD/GDP 11.8 15.7 21.9 28.2 34.3 42.8 42.2 42.8 34.5 34 37.3 40.2 61.1 64.7
ETD/XGS 50.3 81 129 172 167 193 175 178 145 146 163 168 224 211
ETD/GNI 50.3 81 129 172 167 193 175 178 145 146 163 168 224 211
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Table A1 (Continued)
Country Debt indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Malawi ETD/GDP 171 160 101 83.5 139 154 155 151 108 128 131 111 27.6 23.3 22.6
ETD/XGS 577 527 444 391 425 551 606 538 318 428 523 570 147 104 100
ETD/GNI 177 166 103 84.8 143 158 158 154 110 130 133 113 27.9 23.5 23.8
Mali ETD/GDP 153 120 115 127 123 124 123 111 84.6 71.4 68.1 60.7 28 29 25.1
ETD/XGS 664 568 573 488 498 470 459 332 265 270 268 237 87.2 106
ETD/GNI 155 122 117 130 126 127 124 118 91.1 74.1 71.2 63.9 30 27.9 24.4
Mozambique ETD/GDP 336 332 238 203 197 162 171 120 120 83.2 83.9 67.9 41.3 37.4 34.9
ETD/XGS 2389 2128 1610 1523 1610 1233 974 485 432 286 267 209 104 101 105
ETD/GNI 369 361 251 214 208 170 181 130 125 87.5 83.2 68 41.9 39.6 37.4
Nigeria ETD/GDP 140 121 89 78.5 94.2 83.8 68.2 64.7 51.6 51.2 43 19.6 5.2 5.24 5.42
ETD/XGS 335 274 185 175 281 227 126 150 162 120 97.8 42.2 12.1 12.8 13
ETD/GNI 155 132 95 83.7 103 87.5 77.9 70.4 57.8 57.7 48.4 22.3 5.4 5.6 5.9
Senegal ETD/GDP 95.4 80.3 74.7 81.5 81 77 77.2 75.3 77.1 64 49.1 44.5 20.5 22.9 21.6
ETD/XGS 300 260 277 298 292 275 276 262 270 240 186 165 80.2 90.2 86.3
ETD/GNI 99 82.9 75.8 82.7 81.9 78.4 78.7 76.5 64.8 49.4 45.1 20.5 22.7 21.5
Sierra Leone ETD/GDP 168 140 129 138 190 188 187 150 145 153 149 124 89 18.8 19.9
ETD/XGS 568 752 722 987 1175 1507 1035 933 824 661 659 527 357 90.3 122
ETD/GNI 192 149 133 140 201 195 193 154 150 159 157 131 92.8 19.2 20.8
South Africa ETD/GDP 1.67 1.75 2.31 2.21 2.13 2.46 3.37 6.53 6.83 5.76 4.6 4.45 4.6 3.51 3.77
ETD/XGS 7.56 7.7 9.33 8.98 8.32 9.71 12.1 21.7 20.7 20.5 17.2 16.3 15.5 11.2 10.7
ETD/GNI 1.67 1.75 2.31 2.21 2.13 2.46 3.37 6.53 6.83 5.76 4.6 4.45 4.6 3.51 3.77
Tanzania ETD/GDP 160 140 113 92.4 89.5 90.9 78.6 68.4 72.5 70.5 75.4 58.9 28.1 29.6 29
ETD/XGS 776 582 566 570 616 611 467 429 434 359 337 281 130
ETD/GNI 166 144 115 93.9 90.6 92 79.7 69.1 74.1 71.8 76.9 59.7 28.4 29.9 28.9
Togo ETD/GDP 148 113 102 89.8 92.7 96.6 108 106 107 97.4 89 79.9 80.9 79.2 54.3
ETD/XGS 485 347 305 310 312 335 350 335 318 288 265 198 191 189
ETD/GNI 156 117 103 91.5 94.1 99.1 110 108 109 98.7 89.7 81 82 79.4 56.6
Uganda ETD/GDP 85.1 62.7 61.4 62.3 59.9 58.3 56.5 63.9 64.4 71.6 56 49.1 12.7 13.1 15.7
ETD/XGS 974 532 513 467 621 476 530 555 575 629 440 346 83 78.3 100
ETD/GNI 86.5 63.3 61.9 62.5 59.9 58.4 57.5 65.1 65.7 72.9 56.9 50.4 13 13.8 15.9
Zambia ETD/GDP 203 200 216 170 212 187 177 168 177 155 137 75.1 21.3 24.1 20.9
ETD/XGS 565 555 689 565 789 687 652 598 639 541 358 217 55.3 57.4 56.7
ETD/GNI 219 215 230 182 228 197 186 176 185 160 148 79.5 23.9 27.6 22.4
Zimbabwe ETD/GDP 65.1 70.2 58.3 57.9 75.8 72.5 51.7 35 17.8 60.6 102 124 89.9 119 120
ETD/XGS 188 183 161 154 175 156 144 152 193 242 239 219
ETD/GNI 188 183 161 154 175 156 144 152 193 242 239 219
With the exception of South Africa’s debt data, the source of data is World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010 Online Database and IFS online database. The source of South Africa’s debt data is the Reserve
Bank website. ETD is External Debt Stock, GDP is Gross Domestic Product and XGS is Exports of Goods and Services.
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Table A2
Summary statistics.
Regions Statistic Relative
interest rate
Inflation Legal Political Debt to
GDP ratio
Short-term
debt to
reserves ratio
Exports to
GDP ratio
Consumption
imports to
GDP Ratio
Growth
rate of
GDP
Log of
imported
investments
Terms of
trade
Log of
consump-
tion
Log of
exchange
rate
Africa
Mean 0.499 0.448 −0.724 −0.674 0.911 0.021 0.301 0.387 3.282 8.862 1.136 8.995 1.089
Standard
deviation
0.331 2.640 0.578 0.581 1.401 1.067 0.166 0.228 6.717 0.621 0.790 1.779 2.183
Skewness 1.194 12.218 −0.676 −0.360 7.333 −0.115 1.007 2.486 −0.949 0.151 3.671 −3.749 −2.044
Kurtosis 5.033 17.636 2.875 2.487 74.740 5.058 3.781 11.327 13.515 3.579 20.979 17.307 9.192
Observations 925 787 336 336 923 838 910 910 897 897 693 876 913
Latin America
Mean 0.377 1.168 −0.104 −0.068 0.473 −0.161 0.209 0.208 3.206 9.916 1.118 10.442 −0.105
Standard
deviation
0.309 5.376 0.680 0.593 0.274 0.457 0.274 0.119 4.751 0.707 0.388 0.673 2.597
Skewness 1.772 9.460 0.455 0.264 1.625 −2.466 1.625 1.167 −0.517 −0.063 1.202 0.061 −1.279
Kurtosis 7.531 17.797 3.336 2.137 6.756 21.879 6.756 5.085 4.025 2.358 5.119 2.372 4.621
Observations 280 349 140 140 400 396 400 400 400 377 300 393 383
East Asia
Mean 0.696 0.080 0.061 −0.111 0.529 −0.264 0.419 0.414 5.894 10.251 0.833 10.586 2.056
Standard
deviation
0.252 0.079 0.521 0.500 0.455 0.409 0.242 0.210 3.732 0.554 0.185 0.499 1.222
Skewness 0.387 2.865 0.075 0.124 3.917 0.490 1.467 1.164 −1.770 −0.056 −0.530 −0.056 0.228
Kurtosis 2.486 14.798 1.614 1.779 23.056 3.213 4.823 3.525 8.500 2.779 3.226 2.592 1.796
Observations 182 214 84 84 185 175 224 224 225 208 180 221 224
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